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“If a majority be united by a common interest,” wrote James Madison, “the rights of
the minority will be insecure.”1 This possibility animated liberal political and legal thought
during the long nineteenth century, and the specter of majoritarian tyranny that it raised
led countless theorists to devise institutional breakers against the cresting waves of
democracy.
Madison himself recognized two solutions. The first worked through the
representative system, and he famously proposed extending the republic so that the
diversity of interests would make it improbable for a permanent majority to form. 2 The
second was to create “a will in the community independent of the majority” that could
nullify acts of the representative branch. Madison equated this with monarchy and warned
that it offered only a “precarious security; because a power independent of the society may
as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party,
and may possibly be turned against both parties.”3 Many of the Constitution-writers of the
early Republic shared Madison’s worry about the dangers of a “power independent of
society.”4 But, colonial reformers had long asserted the principle that an independent
judiciary should stand as a check against the Crown, and for those worried about legislative
tyranny, the judiciary appeared as a natural substitute for a discredited monarch.
The role of an independent authority capable of checking the elected branches was
transferred from the Crown to the court, and by the mid-nineteenth century the

1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
2. Others championed proportional representation so that the diversity in the electorate would be represented
in the legislature; “fancy franchises,” to give minority classes greater legislative influence; or apportionment
plans that would base representation on interests, occupations, or designated communities.
3. Id.
4. ANNA HARVEY, A MERE MACHINE: THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
40–54 (2013); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 161 (2d ed. 1998).
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independence of the judiciary had come to be seen as a central principle of any just
democratic order. “The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over
themselves,” wrote John Stuart Mill, “might seem axiomatic when popular government
was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the
past.”5 But the United States had shown how majorities could be oppressive, and thus
made clear that “precautions are as much needed against these, as against any other abuse
of power.”6 This argument, he noted, appealed as much to theorists as to the “important
classes in European society,” and so the “tyranny of the majority” came to generally be
“included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.”7
The argument that rights are best protected by an independent judiciary is at least as
pervasive today. Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that to leave the rights of minorities to
“the whims of the political majority” would have severe consequences for all those
marginalized classes “who have nowhere to turn but the courts—litigants who are, by
definition, unable to harness the ‘popular’ authority for their own constitutional interests.”8
Judicial independence, write Bruce Fein and Burt Neuborne, is a fundamental “safeguard
against majoritarian tyranny.”9 The protection of individual rights, Ronald Dworkin
argues, requires that “the majority should not always be the final judge of when its own
power should be limited.”10 An independent and empowered judiciary has been endorsed
by the United Nations as a “Human Rights Priority,” while the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance argues that judicial independence “is critical to
preserving the rule of law.”11
Louis Fisher’s Congress: Protecting Individual Rights and Anna Harvey’s A Mere
Machine offer two powerful dissents from this tradition, arguing from historical and
statistical evidence that this celebration of judicial independence is misplaced and that
individual and minority rights have been better and more reliably protected by popularly
elected representative legislatures than by independent and insulated elites. Each takes aim
at a particular orthodoxy: Fisher that the Court has better protected rights than Congress,
and Harvey that the Court is independent and that this is the source of American rights
protections. Together they provide powerful evidence that our confidence in judicial
independence as a safeguard of rights is ill-founded, and urge us to reconsider the
potentially vital role of representative legislatures.
IN DEFENSE OF CONGRESS
Louis Fisher’s Congress offers a robust defense of the legislature’s role in protecting
5. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (4th ed. 1869).
6. Id. at 13.
7. Id. See also 2 JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 452,
458 (3d ed. 1858); 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 310 (Olivier Zunz ed., Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Library of America 2004) (1840).
8. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1013, 1013–14 (2004).
9. Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About Independent and Accountable Judges?, 84
JUDICATURE 53, 59 (2000); HARVEY, supra note 4, at 3.
10. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: A MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 16 (2d ed. 2005).
11. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 3; Nora Hedling, The Design of the Judicial Branch, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO CONSTITUTION BUILDING 223, 225, 235 (Markus Böckenförde et al. eds., 2011).
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individual rights and fulfilling the country’s collective aspiration to self-government.
These two goals, according to Fisher, define the purpose of American constitutionalism,
but they were not intended to be functionally allocated to distinct institutions, with selfgovernment assigned to Congress and the president, and the judiciary responsible for
protecting rights. Instead, each branch was to pursue these goals as part of an interlocking
system, one in which the Framers expected and hoped Congress would be paramount.
It has been awhile since Congress was held in such high regard. Only twelve percent
of Americans expressed either a “great deal” or “quite a lot of confidence” in Congress in
2017; forty-seven percent had “very little” or “no confidence.”12 At a moment when
Congress can barely be relied upon to fulfill core functions of self-government—such as
fund the government, not default on the debt, or fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court
without partisan obstruction—one might be forgiven for finding a bit far-fetched the notion
that it could be trusted with protecting individual rights. The Supreme Court, by contrast,
still commands broad respect, second only to the military among American public
institutions.
The great value of Fisher’s book is its clear, consistent, and ultimately persuasive
message that this denigration of Congress and valorization of the Court is mistaken history
and misplaced faith. Through extensive historical examples, Fisher demonstrates that
Congress has played a vital role in protecting individual and minority rights, and he
provocatively argues that in doing so it has been more effective and reliable than the other
branches.
Appreciating Congress’s contribution requires that each branch be judged on the
basis of its actions, and not, as almost inevitably works to Congress’ detriment, on its
process or motivation. It is easy to see why this matters. When the Court acts, it explains
its actions as mandated by the dictates of the Constitution. When the president acts, it has
usually had the appearance of being quick, decisive, and deliberate; the process of political
calculation and hemming and hawing tends to happen out of sight. When Congress acts, it
is anything but; indeed, the more it has strayed from a slow, grinding, deliberative process,
the more it has erred. Moreover, an electoral calculus can almost immediately be inferred
from the pattern of support and opposition, creating the reasonable impression that the
institution might not have acted had the political vanes pointed a different way. For Fisher,
then, the primary issue is neither motivation nor process, but competence and the historical
record.
The core of the book lays out the historical record. Chapter Two examines the
intentions of the Framers, and each subsequent chapter provides an overview of how
Congress and the other branches have handled individual rights in a particular area or for
a given category of persons: African Americans (Chapter Three), Women (Chapter Four),
Children (Chapter Five), Religious Liberty (Chapter Six), and Native Americans (Chapter
Seven).
In each of these substantive areas, Fisher highlights Congress’s positive role and
contrasts it with the indifference or bungling of the president and, especially, the Supreme
Court, the book’s primary antagonist. “The capacity of Congress to protect individual and
12. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (Aug. 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidenceinstitutions.aspx.
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minority rights has a long and distinguished history,” he writes, “both in taking the
initiative in safeguarding rights and in passing remedial legislation to correct errors in the
courts. Little in the record over the past two centuries offers convincing evidence that
courts are particularly gifted or reliable in coming to the defense of individual rights.”13
Fisher is an effective advocate for Congress, and the book concludes with
suggestions on how to strengthen Congress’s institutional abilities. For four decades Fisher
served as Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers with the Congressional Research
Service and as Specialist in Constitutional Law with the Law Library of Congress. He
knows and cares about the institution, and believes in the principles of self-government
that it is meant to embody.
The book’s strength is its refutation of the often-uninvestigated assumption that
democratic majorities in America have little interest in protecting the rights of minorities.
Fisher documents how women, children, religious communities, indigenous nations, and
African Americans have often found Congress to be a more welcoming branch, and more
protective of their interests, than either the executive or the judiciary. It was Congress that
tried to prohibit child labor; and it was the Supreme Court that repeatedly stood in its way.
It was the Supreme Court that failed to protect the rights of women—“by and large,” wrote
John D. Johnston, Jr. and Charles L. Knapp in 1971, “the performance of American judges
in the area of sex discrimination can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to
abominable”—and Congress which more often rose to the occasion. 14 The Supreme Court
narrowed Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment protections for African Americans, while
Congress tried to defend black rights during and after Reconstruction.
The book’s coverage of congressional action and judicial decisions is extensive, and
while there could be no real expectation of being exhaustive the book should certainly
serve as a useful introduction for students interested in delving further into the particular
areas that Fisher examines. It is accessibly written and will be a valuable addition to
undergraduate courses on the courts and Congress. More generally, it provides a helpful
reminder for students at all levels that no one institution can claim a permanent superiority
in protecting individual rights, that there is no historical reason to believe that insulated
elites have any greater claim to solicitude in this regard, and that ultimately “a dependence
on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government.”15 By the conclusion,
readers will be fully persuaded that Congress has acted to protect rights, and that it has
often acted when the other branches have refused to do so or when they acted in ways that
narrowed rights protections.
Congress is a spirited defense of the institution in an area where it has few defenders,
and a call for the most important branch in the American constitutional order to not cede
its rightful terrain in defining and protecting rights. But the book’s defense of Congress is
in comparison to the other branches, and while this is a useful exercise it does mean that
the text often reads more as a critique of the Supreme Court. It is the belief that the Court
is uniquely empowered or best able to protect rights and interpret the Constitution, and

13. LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESS: PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, at xi–xii (2016).
14. Id. at 77; John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 676 (1971).
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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that the appropriate posture of members of Congress is to respectfully submit to whatever
it happens to decide, that seems to animate much of Fisher’s critique. “Why give one-third
of the government the final say?” he asks.16
The positive case for Congress, then, is not so much that it has amply protected
individual and minority rights, but rather that it has usually done more than the other
branches. Fisher makes a strong case for this claim, but it is hardly reassuring to those
whose worry is not which institution will protect rights but whether those rights will be
protected at all.
Fisher concedes that “in times of perceived emergencies and fears of disloyalty at
home, all three branches have failed to protect individual rights.”17 To this qualifier could
be added ‘in times of peace and prosperity, for long expanses of American history, so long
as the rights to be protected were those of African Americans.’ Fisher’s summary of
congressional actions to protect African Americans during Reconstruction, and the various
ways in which these actions were restricted or overturned by the courts, is important
history that is known to specialists but less well-known to others. It is a point worth
stressing: during the Civil War and for at least three decades after, the rights of African
Americans had more committed partisans in the representative branches than they did on
the Court.
But it would be a mistake to cast Congress in too heroic a role: in 1884 Congress
declined to reauthorize portions of the now struck down Civil Rights Act of 1875; it failed
eight years later to pass legislation to protect the right to vote; and even before the Plessy
v. Ferguson decision, Congress had affirmed the principle of separate-but-equal in
education by allowing states to set up segregated institutions using federal money. 18 It was
Congress that repealed the federal election laws, refused to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment’s representation clause, declined to pass anti-lynching legislation, and which
designed its internal rules with the intent of giving white southerners an effective veto. If
the Supreme Court made life difficult for advocates of racial equality in the late nineteenth
century, it was Congress which did next to nothing during the first several decades of the
twentieth.
It turns out that none of the branches were particularly willing to protect black
Americans’ rights, except for when it was politically expedient. Congress has probably
been better on balance, and this is an important point to recover. But ultimately the
question of whether Congress or the Court has better protected African American rights
can only be answered by another: which Court and which Congress?
Fisher also suggests that when the Court does act it tends to make a mess of things,
creating problems which ostensibly could have been avoided had the matter been left to
Congress. I am sympathetic to the argument that the legislative branch is better suited to
many of the tasks of rights protections, including balancing conflicting rights and devising
more durable and effective policy protections.
But this is of little value if the legislature is not actually acting to protect the right in
question. Consider the case of abortion rights. The legislative branches might have devised
16. FISHER, supra note 13, at 28.
17. Id. at 19.
18. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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a better framework than the Court established in Roe v. Wade, which Fisher argues was
essentially unworkable.19 But even if more state legislatures had been poised to protect
the right to an abortion, at least some American women would have been denied control
over their bodies, precisely because no one believes that all states would have acted or that
Congress would, or could, have done so in their stead. Roe v. Wade, whatever its faults,
had the virtue of protecting a right for women without the distinctions of geography and
class that would have occurred had it been left to the elected branches.
This applies more generally. If a particular claim is and ought to be a right, and
Congress is silent, surely the Court should act, even if in doing so it devises a policy
framework that is less effective than what Congress might have produced. I expect Fisher
would agree; indeed, it is implicit in his comparison that the Court is also under a mandate
to protect rights. But it does make concerns over the coherence of a Court’s action a
distinctly secondary matter. If the Court acts to protect rights where Congress has failed,
this might represent a “decline in the power of the people the legislature represents” and
“a loss of self-government,”20 and perhaps ought to be regretted on that ground or on
grounds that it is less coherent and durable than congressional action. 21 But if the
legislature will not act, the Court must.
The best hope, then, is perhaps that which was expressed by Alexis de Tocqueville:
that the courts would “serve to correct the aberrations of democracy,” and while never
“thwarting the impulses of the majority” they might nonetheless “slow them down and
guide them.”22
But as Anna Harvey makes clear, this hope too is probably misguided.
THE DEPENDENT COURT
If the Supreme Court in Congress is an unreliable protector of rights, in Anna
Harvey’s A Mere Machine it is reduced to a mechanical agent of the legislature. Harvey
takes aim at two of the most enduring beliefs about the Court: that it is an independent
agent whose decisions reflect some combination of justices’ preferences and their
interpretation of the Constitution; and that such independence would be a good thing if it
were true.
Harvey argues instead that the Supreme Court is highly responsive to the preferences
of the political branches, and in particular to the House of Representatives. And, more
provocatively, she argues that rights are better protected because of this judicial
dependence than they would be with a more independent judiciary. Harvey’s argument is
subtle but guided by a powerful logic, and with her careful empirical analysis she makes
a compelling case and an important contribution in the study of judicial behavior.
The basic outline of the argument and summary of the findings is provided in
Chapter One. The courts, Harvey suggests, were not designed to be independent. They
were instead made dependent on the goodwill of the House, which was given the authority
to initiate impeachment proceedings and originate appropriations bills. “The Constitution
19.
20.
21.
22.

FISHER, supra note 13, at 82 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
Id. at 30, 161.
See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 16.
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 331.
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leashed these judges,” Harvey writes, and “the House of Representatives holds the
leash.”23 Most existing studies have found no evidence for such a leash, but these have
generally been based on problematic measures. Once more “objective” measures are used,
Harvey finds a strong positive association between the preferences of the median
Representative and the decisions of the Court.
Harvey then asks a broader question: “what’s so great about independent courts?”24
She notes, quite rightly, that the logic by which independent courts should provide better
rights protections than elected officials is not entirely clear. “After all,” she writes,
“political leaders who are held accountable to such majorities provide significantly higher
levels of civil rights and liberties than do their more ‘independent’ counterparts.”25 I
expect Louis Fisher would agree.
The remainder of the book expands upon these points. Chapter Two debunks
common arguments in favor of judicial independence, either as the intent of the Framers
or as an accurate description of reality. 26 Chapter Three analyzes judicial decision-making
as a function of the preferences of the median justice and median members of the House
and Senate.27 Chapter Four introduces the puzzle of the “two Rehnquist Courts,” namely
the surprising liberalism of the early Rehnquist Court followed by its sharp move to the
right in the mid-1990s.28 Chapter Five introduces new measures that allow this shift to be
identified and explained, connecting it to the Republican takeover of the House in 1994.29
Chapter Six subjects this finding to a more systematic analysis, controlling for economic
conditions and public opinion.30 Chapter Seven provides evidence that when the
preferences of the Court and House diverge, the Court reduces the number of cases it hears,
avoiding a choice between its own preferences and those of the political branch.31 Chapter
Eight reinterprets the Roberts Court in light of the book’s findings, and Chapter Nine
extends the argument cross-nationally.32
Perhaps the first question that arises is why Harvey finds evidence of judicial
deference when so many previous studies—including that in Chapter Three—find none?
Previous studies, it turns out, have been relying on a problematic coding scheme. The
standard measure of judicial decisions used in the literature is the U.S. Supreme Court
Database, which codes each decision as either liberal or conservative based on a structured
assessment protocol.33 The problem, argues Harvey, is that the subjectivity of the process
allows the codings to be contaminated by the expectation of judicial independence: in
short, a decision might be coded as “liberal” because it was issued by a Court known to be

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

HARVEY, supra note 4, at 291.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 77.
HARVEY, supra note 4, at 107.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 249, 264.
U.S. SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
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liberal and which is assumed to decide cases based on its own preferences. 34
Harvey introduces alternative measures based on Keith Poole and Howard
Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE, on the partisan control of the enacting Congress, and on
the estimated medians of the enacting chambers under divided government. In the first,
the final passage votes for statutes struck down or upheld by Congress are identified and
the ideological direction of the statute is determined by looking at how it was arrayed on
DW-NOMINATE economic liberalism dimension. Relatively few policies, however,
receive a final passage vote. For this reason, Harvey constructs a second measure, which
assigns a conservative or liberal coding to a statute based on which party was in control of
Congress: unified Democratic control results in liberal legislation, while unified
Republican control results in conservative legislation. This still leaves out statutes passed
under divided government, and so Harvey assigns each a location along an ideological
dimension by inferring that it fell at the midpoint between the House and Chamber median
for the enacting Congress.
We are on tricky terrain here. Consider the first measure. DW-NOMINATE scores
are invaluable, but they are not an “objective” measure of the ideological direction of
policy. The scores are based on the assumption that legislators vote according to a spatial
model in which individual preferences are arrayed along an ideological dimension. But we
know that ideology is not the only determinant of vote choice, and that party and other
factors can lead legislators to vote for bills that they would otherwise oppose.35 As a result,
we cannot know a priori whether any given vote is an ideological one, a partisan one, or
something else. To determine whether any given vote is better described as liberal or
conservative in the DW-NOMINATE framework requires close inspection and,
ultimately, a subjective evaluation. Far from perfect, Harvey’s measures do provides a new
and valuable perspective on the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions.
And what is most striking is that across several different measures, and across
numerous model specifications, Harvey persistently finds that Court decisions are
responsive to House preferences. It is a robust finding, and given the different approaches
used it cannot be written off as an artifact of the coding decisions.
The next question is why the House, and not the Senate or some combination of the
two? To be clear, it is not public opinion: Harvey shows that the Court is not responsive
to shifts in an aggregate index of public support for conservative policy positions, nor to
the shifting economic and social indicators—such as the crime rate or unemployment—
that we might expect help drive public mood. It is the House to which the Court responds,
and not the people that this House ostensibly represents.
Harvey argues that this is because the Constitution requires appropriation bills to
originate in the House and assigns this chamber responsibility for initiating impeachment
charges.36 While the House has not impeached a Supreme Court Justice since 1805, it has
impeached federal judges at other levels; and besides, it is possible that the dearth of
34. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 143.
35. As the vote on Medicare Part D made clear, sometimes conservatives vote for liberal policies, and liberals
vote against them. Poole and Rosenthal initially labeled the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE a “party loyalty”
dimension. KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL
CALL VOTING (1997).
36. The House sets the agenda in both. See HARVEY, supra note 4, at 57.
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impeachments is because the “mere existence” of the power has induced “judicial
deference to elected branch preferences.”37 While federal judges are constitutionally
protected from diminishment in pay, they are not protected from a diminishment of pay in
real terms. As a result, we are told, “Federal judges must go cap in hand to the elected
branches every year in an effort to assemble majorities supportive of judicial salary
increases.”38
Indeed, federal judges—including Supreme Court justices—often do lobby for
increased pay, and legislators have often been quite reluctant to listen. 39 More generally,
fights between judges and legislatures over salaries are a persistent feature of American
state politics, suggesting that constitutional provisions against pay reductions do not
induce legislative solicitude toward judges’ social and economic standing.40
The claim that this is what induces judicial deference is ultimately speculative; it is
compatible with the finding of House influence but not tested directly. Indeed, it is difficult
to think of how it might be tested, at least without turning to a historical examination in
which the threat of pay reductions or impeachment can be shown, through process tracing
or other approaches, to have influenced judicial decisions. In any case, the possibility that
judicial deference is induced by a constitutional leash held by the House is provocative,
theoretically supported, and deserving of more research to supplement the careful
empirical evidence brought to bear by Harvey.
Harvey’s finding of judicial responsiveness to House preferences would stand as a
major contribution on its own. But she goes further, arguing that this responsiveness to the
House is a good thing, that the Court’s dependence has helped limit the danger it would
otherwise pose, and that judicial dependence on democratically elected branches is
associated with stronger rights protections around the world.
Here too she is dissenting from an established body of research, one that finds
evidence of a positive relationship between judicial independence and rights protection.
This result, Harvey argues, is due to particular coding decisions and modeling choices. In
this case, Harvey argues that measures of judicial independence do not fully account for
the subtler forms of dependence that she has identified in the American case, and that most
accounts fail to consider how the relative level of rights protection afforded by the
judiciary might be conditional upon the democratic quality of a country’s political
institutions.
The conditional argument was nicely summed up by Thomas Jefferson:
In England, where judges were named and removable at the will of an hereditary
executive, from which branch most misrule was feared, and has flowed, it was a
great point gained, by fixing them for life, to make them independent of that

37. Id. at 12.
38. Id. at 58.
39. Lyle Denniston, Major Victory—and Pay Raises—for U.S. Judges, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 7, 2012, 12:48
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/major-victory-and-pay-raises-for-u-s-judges.
40. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy raised hackles with their insistence that judges need to be paid
more, pointing to the growth in salaries of non-judging peer groups. See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAREND REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2007), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year
-endreport.pdf; Dahlia Lithwick, Courting Cash: Kennedy Weighs in on the Crisis in Judicial Pay, SLATE (Feb.
14, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/02/ courting_cash.html.
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executive. But in a government founded on the public will, this principle operates
in an opposite direction, and against that will. 41
In short, independent judiciaries should enhance rights protections when the legislature or
executive is not subject to popular control. Where these branches are elected, however,
they will be more solicitous of popular rights and independent courts relatively less so.
Here too the argument is persuasive and the findings are robust to different
specifications. This is especially true of the finding that judicial independence is positively
associated with rights protections in less democratic countries and negatively associated
in more democratic countries. It is best, it seems, to be in an extensively majoritarian
regime, one in which small elite bodies are either not able to overturn legislation or cannot
do so without being subjected to the control of the elected branches. The worst regimes
for rights protections are, unsurprisingly, non-majoritarian and non-democratic. But in this
case an independent judiciary is, all things considered, a net positive. The much-praised
virtues of judicial independence are not illusory; but they are conditional on the democratic
character of the government.
A Mere Machine advances a compelling argument that the Court does defer to
popular majorities, not through some mystical ability to gauge public opinion but through
the control that the House of Representatives can bring to bear upon it. It is an excellent
example of how careful empirical analyses, informed by theory, can lead to new and
interesting discoveries. It will be essential reading for graduate and undergraduate students
in public law and American institutions.
WIGS OR DEMOCRATS?
Both Congress and A Mere Machine share an appreciation for representative
democracy, at least when compared with the alternative of judiciaries accountable to no
one but themselves.
Their arguments, however, are not entirely compatible. If Harvey is correct that the
Supreme Court mechanically follows the House, then a good portion of the blame Fisher
directs toward the Court should rightfully rest with Congress. Again, the case of black
Americans’ political and civil rights is illustrative: the long indifference of the Court to
black rights, from Plessy to Brown, comes after the defeat of congressional Republican
efforts to protect the vote and after the federal government, through Congress, has given
its imprimatur to racial segregation in education. If the Court follows the House, then the
House’s preferences had been made clear by the time Plessy reached the docket. This, of
course, shifts the weight of responsibility back to Congress.
And it is here where responsibility ultimately lies. This strikes me as the unavoidable
implication of both texts: if Fisher is right, Congress does rights protection better, and
ought to be more active in this domain; if Harvey is right, the House is responsible for
Court decisions anyway, with the slack in the Court’s leash more likely to result in a
downward ratcheting of rights rather than their enhanced protection.42
This is not, for me at least, a conclusion that inspires much optimism. Fisher is
41. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 274 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816)
(copy on file with the Tulsa Law Review)).
42. Id. at 291.
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entirely persuasive that democratic institutions often protect rights more than unelected
institutions. Yet, it is also apparent that they often neglect, and not infrequently oppress,
minority or politically weak groups. Indeed, in both texts one gets the sense that the rights
that are most effectively protected by democratic majorities are those in which those
majorities share the benefits.43 In Harvey, this takes the form of an occasional
transformation in the object of analysis, with “rights protections” becoming the provision
of “public goods.”44 For Fisher, the strongest evidence of congressional activism comes
in the area of religious liberty: “religious interests often fare well in the political
marketplace,” he writes.45 It seems likely that this is in part because, while most
Americans are religious and Christian, no one denomination has been demographically
dominant. So long as “Christian” did not have the political relevance of “Catholic,”
“Presbyterian,” or “Baptist,” we tended to be in Madison’s world, where no majority group
is united in a common interest against the minority. But the treatment by Congress and
state legislatures of Mormons,46 Jehovah’s Witnesses,47 and Muslims,48 serves as a
cautionary tale about the caprices of majority rule, and the limits of both the political
marketplace and the judiciary in protecting minority rights.
Courts, it seems, are not very reliable protectors of what John Hart Ely called
“society’s habitual unequals.”49 But neither are representative institutions, unless there is
a good reason for them to be so, rooted in the political configuration of a given place and
time and in the electoral interests of its members. To paraphrase, and contradict, Ronald
Dworkin, the United States is a more just society than it would have been had its
constitutional rights been left to the conscience of unelected judiciaries rather than
majoritarian institutions.50 And it would have been more just still had those majoritarian
institutions themselves possessed more of a conscience.
Where does this leave us? Parchment rights are no salvation, nor are independent
judiciaries. However uncertain, bitter, and polarized, active engagement in democratic
politics remains our best hope.

43. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 20 (1985) (“[T]he Congress and the President can be counted upon to defend
most of us from the infringement of fundamental liberties, because the political majorities to which those
departments of government answer demand such protection.”).
44. In the book’s index, the entry “Public Goods” simply says, “See Rights protection.” HARVEY, supra note
4, at 292, 361.
45. Of the book’s approximately 111 pages devoted to the case studies, forty-four are focused on religious
liberty once one includes religious issues in other chapters than that on religious liberty itself. FISHER, supra note
13, at 103–13, 115–35, 137–39, 146–56.
46. Id. at 126–27.
47. Id. at 104–11.
48. COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, LEGISLATING FEAR: ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ITS IMPACT IN
THE UNITED STATES 59–74 (2013), available at https://www.cair.com/islamophobia/legislating-fear-2013report.html.
49. John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 453
(1978).
50. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 356 (1986).
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